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Abstract 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is struggling in its 
attempts to address the threat of anthropogenic climate change and create an effective 
post-Kyoto international climate agreement. One substantial part of the problem is con-
sensus decision making within the Convention, which effectively gives every party a veto 
over the process. Majority voting is one potential alternative which is already being dis-
cussed within the UNFCCC. A comparative analysis of consensus and majority voting sug-
gests that majority voting is superior in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness since it 
is a better consensus-builder, a speedier decision making process and provides opportuni-
ties for a semi-global approach to international climate policy. The objective in this paper 
is to investigate how majority voting could be implemented in the UNFCCC and to consider 
politically feasible and effective approaches to voting arrangements for the Convention. 
Implementing majority voting in the Convention faces legal, political and institutional ob-
stacles. While it has growing support from some states, others remain staunchly opposed, 
with concerns over voting on financial matters being particularly sensitive. A type of Lay-
ered Majority Voting with larger majorities for financial and substantial matters is consid-
ered to be the optimal approach in balancing political feasibility and effectiveness. A 
weighted voting system differentiated on the basis of mitigation commitments, vulnerabil-
ity and population (Common but Differentiated Voting) is proposed as an ideal approach. 
Despite these possibilities a change in decision making will likely require a crisis to cata-
lyse the necessary political will and break the current path dependency that has been built 
around consensus.  
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The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC- the Convention) is 
the cornerstone of the international climate regime. Despite its central role and im-
portance, the Convention has struggled to achieve any lasting or effective agreement to-
wards its aim of avoiding dangerous anthropogenic climate change through meaningful in-
ternational mitigation of greenhouse gases. Consensus decision making has been identified 
as one of the key reasons for these shortcomings as it sacrifices effectiveness in favour of 
legitimacy (Biermann and Gupta, 2011, Schroeder et al., 2012). Consensus itself has no 
clear legal definition under the Convention. It is generally employed as ‘negative consen-
sus’ or ‘unanimity’, i.e. the absence of a stated objection implies agreement (LRI, 2011a). 
Accordingly, consensus as practiced in the UNFCCC is simply the absence of a veto 
(Bodansky, 2009). The UNFCCC currently uses consensus as a default rule since the pro-
posed official rules of procedure were blocked by Saudi Arabia in 1991 at the last Intergov-
ernmental Negotiating Committee directly before the first Conference of the Parties (COP- 
the annual negotiating forum for parties to the Convention) (Michaelowa and Luomi, 2012). 
‘Draft Rule 42’ which specifies options for majority voting, was used as the basis for this 
action to allow Saudi Arabia to maintain a veto, or at least the threat of one, within the 
ongoing negotiations (Depledge, 2008). The Convention has now been operating for 20 
years in a legal vacuum for decision making. In the absence of specific rules on decision 
making there has been a general understanding amongst parties that consensus is needed 
for the adoption of substantive decisions (Yamin and Depledge, 2004).1 This situation is in-
creasingly hindering progress in the current negotiations. 
The recent history of the UNFCCC is one scattered with diplomatic failures in decision 
making. The Copenhagen Accord could not be adopted by consensus and was widely seen 
as a failure in terms of both process and outcomes (Bodansky, 2010). COP16 in Mexico in 
2010 achieved an agreement mainly through the skilful diplomacy of the Mexican chairs 
and their liberal interpretation of consensus with agreement being declared despite the 
protests of Bolivia. At COP18 agreement was achieved at the expense of Russia, whose ob-
jections were ignored at the final plenary session (Stowe, 2012). The attainment of this 
false consensus has proven costly. Russia in 2013 blocked the progress of the Subsidiary 
Body for Implementation (SBI) for a full two weeks at the Subsidiary Bodies meeting in 
Bonn (Kemp, 2013). They did so by vetoing the adoption of the official agenda, demanding 
the addition of an item discussing decision making and procedural matters. While the em-
barrassment of COP18 was clearly a motive, Russia made some valid points and has reignit-
                                            
 
1 There are a small number of exceptions that can be put to a vote. These include procedural matters such as 
appealing against a point of order or putting forward a proposal or an amendment to a proposal. Amend-
ments to the Convention can also be taken by a three-quarters majority vote, an issue which will be dis-
cussed later under section 4.1.  
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ed the interest in decision making change in the UNFCCC. Business-as-usual-decision mak-
ing in the UNFCCC clearly needs to be reconsidered if progress is to be made.  
One concept that has been presented as a pathway forward for the Convention is the idea 
of using majority voting. Mexico and Papua New Guinea have recently proposed a move 
towards majority voting through amendments to articles 7 and 18 of the Convention 
(UNFCCC)2. This proposal was tabled in 2011 and has since been discussed as an agenda 
item at both COP17 (as a formal contact group) and COP18 (as informal consultations and 
bilaterals). These discussions have not been successful thus far and consensus is still em-
ployed within the negotiations. Despite the importance of this issue and the attention it is 
receiving within the UNFCCC there has been no sustained analysis of how majority voting 
could be implemented into the UNFCCC or other multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) within the academic literature.  
Voting and decision making rules are crucial leverage points for the design and reform of 
international environmental institutions. Voting arrangements are key to determining who 
legitimately controls an institution and its outcomes (Koremenos et al., 2001). Yet many 
other MEAs are affected by the same lack of official rules of procedure. The Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the Stockholm Convention and the Rotterdam Convention all currently 
operate with ‘interim’ rules and consensus processes due to disputes over voting (Young, 
2002, UNEP, 2012). Future arrangements within the UNFCCC could influence decision mak-
ing in these MEAs as well as in newly created environmental bodies. Many scholars 
(Biermann, 2000, Olsen and Elder, 2012, Esty and Ivanova, 2001) have advocated for a 
form of qualified majority voting or weighted voting to be employed within a proposed fu-
ture World Environment Organisation (WEO). Voting within the UNFCCC is not just of im-
portance to the Convention, but will likely have ramifications for the wider realm of envi-
ronmental governance. This research will explore the issue of voting in the UNFCCC 
through the following questions: 
1. Drawing upon other case studies of consensus and voting arrangements used inter-
nationally, is majority voting likely to be more efficient or effective than consen-
sus? 
2. What are the institutional barriers to and opportunities in changing decision mak-
ing processes, particularly towards voting procedures, in the UNFCCC? 
3. How can majority voting be implemented within the UNFCCC? What is the most po-
litically feasible approach to voting arrangements for the Convention? What could 
be an ideal form of voting, regardless of current political circumstances? 
 
                                            
 
2 This proposal, and most proposed voting arrangements, use voting as a last resort when all efforts to reach 
consensus have failed.  




In the first of four stages of analysis I conduct a comparative review of consensus and vot-
ing. I then provide a legal, political and institutional examination of the barriers and op-
portunities for a change from consensus to voting were before discussing a number of dif-
ferent voting scenarios. I will focus on output legitimacy, rather than the ‘input’ legitima-
cy, by examining decision making systems based on their ability to allow the Convention to 
meet its core objective of avoiding the dangerous impacts of anthropogenic climate 
change. The reason for this is both for analytical clarity (issues of legitimacy have been 
thoroughly explored elsewhere in the literature e.g. (Stevenson and Dryzek, 2012)) and 
simply because the legitimacy of the UNFCCC is more likely to be undermined by a lack of 
results rather than procedural injustices (Vihma, 2011: 7).  
Data were collected through 13 semi-structured interviews with key informed individuals, 
as well as observations from negotiations and lobbying. My analysis draws upon Historical 
Institutionalism and Systems Thinking to create a hybrid methodology. I make use of the 
concept of “Path Dependency” from Historical Institutionalism to help explain decision 
making change and inertia within the UNFCCC. Path dependency is a concept which sug-
gests that the trajectories of institutions are largely determined by crucial foundational 
choices which then constrain future change and often reinforce the existing institutional 
model (Thelen, 1999). Systems thinking and influence diagrams are used to depict the 
overall system of institutional barriers and opportunities for change in decision making and 
to generate possible scenarios for future change based upon these variables. Influence dia-
grams are visual representations of interacting variables within a system produced from 
blending and analysing interviewee worldviews. Within the diagrams arrows show the flow 
of influence between different variables, where variables are issues or changeable system 
aspects (Proust and Newell, 2010). Polarities display how one variable affects the rate of 
change in another variable. Accordingly a ‘+’ indicates an increase in the rate of change in 
the next variable. Influence diagrams allow for the identification of important complex 
system features such as feedback loops and leverage points. 
 
3 Comparative Analysis: Consensus and Majority Voting 
Before an analysis of voting can be worthwhile it is logical to first shot that voting is pref-
erable to consensus in achieving output legitimacy. This section combines interview data 
and existing literature to provide a comparative analysis of consensus and majority voting.  
3.1 Efficiency: Building Consensus in the Shadow of a Vote 
The idea that voting is more efficient and quicker than consensus in reaching outcomes is 
relatively uncontroversial. The basic reasoning is that 193 countries, all with vetoes, ad-
dressing a controversial and complex global problem, does not equal a successful agree-
ment, let alone a great deal of speed or efficiency (Vihma, 2011). Similar sentiments have 
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been expressed in regards to the practice of consensus with the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) (Pauwelyn, 2005, Tijmes-Lhl, 2009, Low, 2001). Former WTO director-general Pas-
cal Lamy has branded the practice of consensus as “medieval” and stated that “there is no 
way to structure and steer discussions amongst 146 members in a manner conducive to 
consensus…. The decision making need(s) to be revamped” (Denny et al., 2003). Even with-
in the Council of the European Union, where voting is allowed, the qualified majority vot-
ing threshold of 74% has been criticised by scholars as too high, making it less effective ef-
ficient and unfairly biased towards the status quo, particularly with the enlargement of 
the EU and increasing diversity of membership (Baldwin et al., 2001, Leech, 2002). The EU 
itself recognised the problems of consensus within a large and diverse group and attempt-
ed to accompany it’s expansion in membership with an expansion in voting to areas previ-
ously covered by consensus through the Treaty of Nice (Baldwin et al., 2001) In political 
science the tendency for unanimous decision making to be restricted by the least enthusi-
astic party has been dubbed the “Law of the Least Ambitious Program” (Hovi and Sprinz, 
2006: 28). In simpler terms it is renowned for producing ‘lowest-common denominator’ 
outcomes and serving the interests of the least ambitious party. Biermann et al. (2010) 
highlight that political science has shown majority voting to be a speedier more efficient 
process than consensus, namely because a stalemate cannot be maintained by an individu-
al or small number of parties.  
One lesser acknowledged benefit of voting is that it can act as a consensus builder. Voting 
often acts as a deterrent to blocking, a kind of ‘nuclear threat’ that encourages compro-
mise. In consensus decision making the objecting party can simply maintain a veto until its 
demands are met. There is little incentive to compromise, leading to consensus often be-
ing “the best decision rule least likely to produce consensual behaviour” (McGann, 2004: 
14). Voting switches the emphasis away from minority blockers and gives greater leverage 
to the majority. The threat of a vote often forces the least ambitious to become more ac-
commodating.  
Many international institutions with majority voting have never had to use it. Both the 
Montreal Protocol and Global Environmental Facility (GEF) are notable examples of envi-
ronmental agreements which have majority voting but have passed all decisions by consen-
sus (UNEP, 2007, del Castillo, 2009). Hovi and Sprinz observe that out of a large sample 
size of international institutions the majority (79%) practice consensus, but only a minority 
(47%) actually have it codified into their rules (2006: 35). It is a recurring phenomenon for 
international bodies with formal voting procedures to practice consensus (Lockwood 
Payton, 2010), as the EU has regularly done (Heisenberg, 2005). The Council of European 
Council has a well-known ‘culture of consensus’ (Heisenberg, 2005: 82): explicit voting is 
rarely done in the council (Mattila and Lane, 2001, Mattila, 2004, Heisenberg, 2005, 
Baldwin et al., 2001) and when it does occur it is usually only due to the dissent of a single 
party (Mattila, 2009). Unsurprisingly, countries generally prefer to avoid conflict and reach 
consensual agreement rather than resort to a vote. The shadow of a vote hanging over-
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head, like a procedural Sword of Damocles, provides a condition that is more conductive to 
consensus outcomes than consensus is. 
3.2 Effectiveness: Critical Mass Governance 
Voting should lead to either more progressive or no worse agreements than consensus 
would. While voting is more efficient, the issue of whether it leads to substantially differ-
ent results than consensus is more difficult to ascertain (Lockwood Payton, 2010). Consen-
sus and voting may lead to the same results simply at different rates. Arguably transferring 
power from blockers to the majority and enhancing consensus-building could lead to pro-
gressive decisions where deadlock would otherwise exist. Some interviewees expressed 
concerns that if a country was outvoted on certain issues it would simply refuse to abide 
by the decision or to implement it. It should be noted that institutions generally have 
mechanisms in place to ensure that this does not occur. The EU, for example, has a collec-
tion of incentives and penalties designed to encourage states to stay within the Union even 
when they are on the losing end of an important vote. Similarly the Convention could lev-
erage access to carbon markets or adaptation and mitigation finances to encourage state 
compliance with voting outcomes. However, the possibility that some states would either 
drop out of the Convention or a treaty due to objections over substance is not necessarily a 
negative one. While some may view it as a potential weakness, a semi-global approach 
could prove to be ultimately more effective in achieving the aims of the Convention. 
Voting could produce more progressive outcomes by allowing for decision making and im-
plementation by a semi-global, critical mass of countries. Such a form of ‘Critical Mass 
Governance’ (CMG) could take one of three different forms within the UNFCCC: 1. The en-
tire regime operates by a critical mass of countries, while those who are unwilling to work 
by voting drop out of the regime (this will be analysed later); 2. A treaty could work by a 
critical mass whereby a large segment of countries create a semi-global agreement that is 
not watered down to appeal to the participation of recalcitrant states, or; 3. Voting is 
used within specific issues under a treaty (or within separate protocols) in order to unblock 
individual negotiating tracts and have particular issues move forward by a critical mass. 
The creation of a critical mass agreement which avoids the issue of appealing to the US 
and other states with domestic constraints or problematic positions could be possible and 
preferable. This is important to consider since the desire to appease certain parties has led 
to a history of watered-down agreements. An example of this is the participation of the 
US, which is one the most controversial and important topics for global climate policy. As 
the largest developed country emitter, and an economic superpower, the US is in a key po-
sition to take a leadership role on addressing climate change. Unfortunately, instead they 
have undermined the climate regime on numerous occasions, including signing the Kyoto 
Protocol and subsequently not ratifying it (Depledge, 2005). While many other countries 
have done similar acts, the actions of the US, in light of its size and power, have proven to 
be particularly destructive to the regime. Underpinning these actions are a number of both 
domestic political and institutional hurdles. Firstly, the US has a unique constitution 
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whereby international treaties must pass a two thirds majority vote in the senate and have 
the same legal status as federal law once ratified (Skodvin and Andresen, 2009). This 
means that ratification is a very serious issue and one third of the senate (34 senators) can 
block any such move. Additionally, US politics is rather antagonistic; climate change is po-
litically polarised within the US and combined with lobbying, vested interests and in-
creased partisanship the issue has become politically toxic (Bang et al., 2012). It is unlikely 
that the US will be able to ratify any progressive binding multilateral climate treaty unless 
a substantial political shift occurs or there are changes to the US Constitution. The second 
would be highly unlikely to happen in the near future. This tension underpins to current 
movement of negotiations towards a non-binding ‘pledge and review’ model for the 2015 
climate agreement. Accordingly, a “deep, but narrow” climate agreement with strong sub-
stance and commitments with limited membership that expands over time could be pref-
erable to a “broad, but shallow” agreement (Aldy et al., 2003). One interview respondent 
alluded to this prospect in mentioning a concept from the film Field of Dreams in that you 
could “build it (an effective architecture) and they will come.”3 In practice this would be 
the second form of CMG. A majority of parties would create their own protocol without 
seeking to appeal to the interests of parties such as the US which could undermine the sub-
stance of the agreement and still not be capable of ratifying it.  
Similar ideas have been put forward under other international institutions. Low has advo-
cated for a form Critical Mass Decision Making within the WTO, suggesting that a subset of 
parties could push a progressive agenda ahead on particular issues and create a better dif-
ferentiation of commitments while maintaining the coherence of the multilateral system 
(Low, 2001). Low further suggests using a form of consensus at the inception of an agree-
ment, and letting the critical mass dictate terms from there. This is close to the third form 
of CMG where voting would be applied in order to unblock specific issues. For example, a 
2015 agreement could consist of numerous optional opt-out protocols where a smaller 
number of progressive parties could work by voting to advance particular issues (e.g. 
REDD+, market based mechanisms or building pre-2020 mitigation ambition) and build trust 
and momentum for the wider regime. Parties who refuse to yield to the outcomes of voting 
on these issues could simply ‘opt-out’ of that protocol. Contrary to Low, I would suggest 
that the creation of these critical mass tracts would be better instigated by a voting sys-
tem rather than consensus, otherwise particular states could simply block the adoption of 
a certain protocol that is undesirable to them. This is a logical and promising approach 
since on individual topics there is often only one, or a small handful of countries, blocking 
progress. For example India and Saudi Arabia prevented action on hydroflurocarbons (HFCs) 
and ‘black carbon’ recently at COP19, but the main opposition against attempts to regu-
late aviation and bunker fuels has come from Singapore. Given this differentiation of in-
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terests between blockers, it makes more sense to use voting to exclude particular parties 
from certain topics rather than from an entire regime or treaty. This would presumably 
make this the most politically feasible, and perhaps effective, form of CMG. Free-riding 
and leakage could be potential problems for both of these forms of CMG within the climate 
negotiations, but could reasonably be addressed through incentives and/or measures 
against non-parties. Moreover, leakage concerns will decline as participation grows and 
there are also positive leakage and spill-over effects such technology development and dif-
fusion from climate policy leaders. This new idea of CMG enabled by and working through 
voting has received no exploration within existing literature on the UNFCCC or MEAs thus 
far. This is due to both its radical nature and the existing political realities of consensus, 
yet it nonetheless warrants further attention.  
The outcome of a critical mass agreement is doubtful since voting usually acts as a consen-
sus-builder. Parties are more likely to stay under the Convention or join a new agreement 
rather than dropping out or refusing to participate, but such an occurrence isn’t necessari-
ly a negative one. Voting could leave the door open to a world of semi-globalism, while 
still maintaining the option of US participation in the future. Timmons and Roberts observe 
that: “For two decades now, the US has been the bull in the china shop of climate negotia-
tions – repeatedly smashing any small progress that was being deliberately arranged” 
(2011: 779). It would be fundamentally misguided to continue to tie international decision 
making to the destructive bull of climate negotiations. 
 
4 Legal Aspects: Implementation 
There are primarily two ways of adopting majority voting into the UNFCCC. Firstly the 
Convention could be amended to allow for voting. Secondly, the Rules of Procedure with a 
resolved Draft Rule 42 could be officially adopted by the COP. The rules of procedure 
would need to be adopted by consensus according to article 7.2(k) of the Convention. This 
is perhaps why Papua New Guinea and Mexico have opted to attempt inducing change 
through the first path, i.e. amending the Convention itself. 
4.1 Amendments to the Convention 
Superficially, the implementation of majority voting through amending the Convention has 
promise, but upon closer inspection it possesses tremendous legal difficulties. Under Arti-
cle 15.3 the Convention can be changed through a three quarters majority vote: “If all ef-
forts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall 
as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and 
voting at the meeting”. At first glance it appears that majority voting could be adopted 
via a majority vote. Yet progress is not so simple. Article 15.4 of the Convention stipulates 
that changes to the Convention are only binding upon those parties who have accepted and 
ratified it. In other words, amendments only apply to those who voted for it and ratify the 
amendments thereafter. Thus, majority voting could be introduced via a three quarters 
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majority vote, but the dissent of a few parties could result in an interesting situation for 
the Convention: the majority of parties working by voting while others operate under con-
sensus. Parties functioning under different decision making rules could ultimately be coun-
ter-productive by requiring dual COP decisions, and engender confusion in already overly 
complex institution (LRI, 2011b). Such a situation is likely to occur since ratification is of-
ten a long process and gives all states time to either reject, or indefinitely abstain from, 
the ratification process. On the other hand, this could be a useful and simple pathway to 
enable the first form of CMG. The critical mass (which would need to be at least three-
quarters of parties) in this case would simply be those countries that are willing to work by 
voting and ratify the amendments to the Convention. However, this form of CMG would 
likely be inferior to the other two forms since the critical mass is defined by those who are 
willing to work by voting rather than those necessarily seeking environmentally effective 
outcomes (although there would probably be some overlap between the two categories as 
most of the parties supporting voting are also the generally regarded as more progressive 
states by nature, but this is not guaranteed). Another important point is that empirical 
studies have shown that states are much more likely to ratify and stay within an ‘opt-out’ 
protocols rather than ratify and join an ‘opt-in’ protocol (Galbraith, 2012). Amendments to 
the convention can be seen as a kind of ‘opt-in’ scenario as parties will need to vote for 
and ratify the amendments. However if majority voting was instead implemented through 
adopting rules of procedure it would be more of a ‘opt-out’ scenario requiring parties to 
intentionally leave the Convention, suggesting that more parties would stay within the 
framework.  
4.2 Rules of Procedure 
Majority voting through the adoption of the rules of procedure, while requiring consensus, 
does not need ratification, making it an attractive path for implementation. The rules of 
procedure with a resolved Draft Rule 42 could be officially adopted by the COP, although 
that would require consensus agreement. There is a possibility that a blocker would veto 
such a measure, as Saudi Arabia did to the original rules of procedure. However, there is a 
loophole since consensus is a flexible concept which has no official legal definition within 
the UNFCCC or internationally. As recent experiences in COP16 and COP18 show, consensus 
technically can be achieved despite opposition. There is a political avenue for a strong COP 
president to promote adoption of the rules of procedure.  
An important point is that the adoption of the rules of procedure, unlike amendments to 
the Convention, does not require ratification. The only way to veto their adoption would 
be to maintain a formal objection after the decision has been made and follow through 
with a legal process to dispute the ruling of consensus (Schwarte C. et al., 2011). Countries 
who have been overruled to achieve consensus previously, such as Bolivia or Russia, have 
not taken such action. Bolivia threatened to take legal action through the ICJ but has thus 
far failed to do so (Schwarte C. et al., 2011). Russia, despite its most recent actions, also 
not followed through to procedurally dispute the consensus ruling. This suggests that the 
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political nature and long legal process of questioning a consensus decision deters parties 
from doing so. Perhaps another reason is that it is difficult to imagine how exactly a legal 
decision could be executed. Article 14.2 of the Convention stipulates that dispute settle-
ment between parties can occur through negotiation, other peaceful means or submission 
of the dispute to the ICJ. However, the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ only occurs when 
both parties have agreed to submit to its decision. To complicate matters further it is un-
clear who the disputer would take legal action against; the host nation and chair, or the 
entire COP? The chair is seen simply as a facilitator of the will of the parties and not a par-
ty representative; and taking a case against the entire COP is difficult as it require all par-
ties to the Convention to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Furthermore, if a party did 
maintain a formal objection it is unclear what the outcome would be since consensus is not 
officially defined within the UNFCCC or the UN. It is difficult to dispute consensus if there 
is no official definition. The only two current international legal instruments to define con-
sensus so far are the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) under ar-
ticle 161.7(e) and the Dispute Settlement Standing (DSU) of the WTO under Annex II of the 
WTO agreement (UNFCCC, 2011a). If parties were overruled to pass the rules of procedure 
there is a high probability that they would not follow through with any threatened chal-
lenge and the decision would stand; even if they did take legal action it is unlikely to be 
successful in repealing the rules of procedure through the ICJ.  
Overall, given the problem of ratification, the adoption of the rules of procedure provides 
a legally and politically feasible option to introduce voting into the UNFCCC. This is a legal 
opportunity, but the shift towards majority voting is still largely contingent upon underly-
ing political and institutional dynamics. 
 
5 Political Dynamics 
No agreement exists on the current voting proposal. Bodansky and Rajamani (2013) note 
that the COP is currently split over the choice between consensus and voting, with no clear 
solution to the deadlock in sight. The general divide is between supporters such as the Al-
liance of Independent Latin American and Caribbean States (AILAC), the Environmental In-
tegrity Group (EIG) and the EU against vehement opponents such as Saudi Arabia and Boliv-
ia. Others such as the US, India and China have remained tight-lipped. However, these 
“stonewall responses” (Vihma, 2011: 7) could be an indication of rejection (Vihma and Ku-
lovesi, 2012). They simply don’t need to outwardly take a position since Saudi Arabia is al-
ready dedicated to blocking any progress on the issue. The politics of this are complex and 
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Table 1: Group Positions towards Voting 
Negotiating Group Stance 
AILAC The AILAC grouping is one of the strongest proponents of the majority 
voting proposal. Member states such as Colombia and Costa Rica vocally 
supported the proposal during discussions at COP17 (ENB, 01/12/2011) 
and have since then maintained this sympathy. In the most recent talks 
on voting Colombia called for the adoption of rules of procedure as a 
“key matter for transparency” and noted that “it’s clear that consensus 
is not always possible”4. 
ALBA ALBA has been opposed to the majority voting proposal. The reasons for 
this are quite clear: ALBA members such as Bolivia have been amongst 
the foremost users of the veto (although their intentions may have been 
noble at times) and Bolivia may still have negative memories of COP16. 
Other members of ALBA showed a willingness to agree to rules of proce-
dure, as long as draft rule 42 specifies some form of consensus.5 
AOSIS AOSIS has not yet discussed the majority voting proposal as a bloc or 
consequently developed a common position on this.6 The current chair-
manship of AOSIS is supportive of the idea of majority voting.7 
BASIC Most of the BASIC bloc such as China and India has refused to take a pub-
lic stance on this issue, which suggests that they oppose the notion (Vi-
hma, 2011). In the most recent negotiations both China and India stated 
that consensus has worked very well in many cases and that the focus 
should be on improving implementation, not decision making.8 However, 
it is unclear whether this constitutes direct opposition to voting or was 
part of their wider strategy of pushing for greater access to financing 
and ‘means of implementation’ under most discussions and agenda items 
at COP19.  
 
  
                                            
 
4 Personal observation of contact group on voting agenda item under COP at COP19 18-11-13. 
5 Interaction with an ALBA negotiator 03-06-13. 
6 Interaction with AOSIS Chair Ambassador Marlene Inemwin Moses at a public seminar 19-02-13. 
7 Ibid 
8 Personal observation of contact group on voting agenda item under COP at COP19 18-11-13. 




The EU The EU has been supportive of the majority voting proposal (ENB, 
13/12/2011). During interviews and interactions many EU respondents 
mentioned that while they supported the principle of majority voting 
they would prefer some form of weighted voting in comparison to the 
traditional ‘one country – one vote’ system.  
The LDCs The majority voting proposal has not yet been discussed officially by the 
LDCs. Some were open to the idea and suggested that the bloc would be 
likely to support it given their frustration with the current system and 
desire for a speedier process.9 
Umbrella Group Some states such as the US and Canada have refused to take a clear pub-
lic stance, which suggests that they have concerns. In the most recent 
discussions on voting Canada questioned the problem of ratification and 
asked “how would voting rules operate”, while the US observed that for 
now time and effort would be better spent formulating the 2015 agree-
ment rather than engaging in a debate on decision making.10 Other coun-
tries in the bloc expressed concerns that G77 could easily unify and out-
vote developed countries on matters of finance.11 
 
The political dynamics behind the majority voting proposal are important to determine 
both the optimal design of a voting system and the general political feasibility of such a 
shift in procedure. Yet country positions are fluid and can change over time (Downie, 
2012), and therefore so can the political feasibility of a proposal. This can be seen in the 
current voting proposal with a number of countries, even Saudi Arabia, becoming more 
open to discussion around the issue since the blockage of the Subsidiaries Bodies meeting 
in 201312. Indeed, at COP19 Saudi Arabia, while opposing voting for most matters, declared 
that “the one area when we can talk about voting is when we talk about financing”13. 
While this is naturally part of Saudi national interest as part of the G-77, and confirms the 
suspicion of the Umbrella Group, it nevertheless suggests an evolution of their position 
over time.  
 
                                            
 
9 Interaction with an East African delegate 04-06-13 
10 Personal observation of contact group on voting agenda item under COP at COP19 18-11-13 
11 Interaction with an Umbrella Group delegate 06-06-12 
12 Interaction with a Pacific Island Delegate 14-06-13. 
13 Personal observation of contact group on voting agenda item under COP at COP19 18-11-13 . 
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6 Institutional Barriers and Drivers for Change 
Institutional dimensions such as discourses, rules and information flows shape how count-
ries engage with the issue of decision making change. There are two distinct types of insti-
tutional forces at play: barriers that reinforce the status quo; and drivers that create mo-
mentum for the transformation of decision making processes. Both of these will be explo-
red in order to identify leverage points for creating change in the UNFCCC.  
6.1 Barriers 
Pandora’s Box: Some respondents suggested there is a concern amongst parties that 
amending the Convention would be similar to opening “Pandora’s box”14, as amendments 
could set a precedent for ongoing change to the principles and annexes of the Convention. 
This view is understandable given that there is a concurrent proposal by Russia to amend 
the annexes of the Convention. Major developing countries strongly oppose the notion of 
revisiting the annexes since it would likely result in a change to their status and responsi-
bilities. Such anxiety was evident at COP18 in the final draft text of the Ad-hoc Working 
Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action which specified that the process of reviewing the 
temperature goal of the Convention “is not a review of the Convention itself” (UNFCCC, 
2012). A recurrent aspect of ADP negotiations has been the assertion by some parties that 
they will not reopen or reinterpret the Convention.15 Fears over re-opening the Convention 
mitigate against the adoption of majority voting through amendments, although not for the 
adoption of rules of procedure.  
Consensus as a Norm: There was a common perception amongst interviewees that consen-
sus is a UN norm, more so than voting. This is partially true. Consensus is perhaps the best 
reflection of the legal principle of sovereignty which the UN is built upon. But voting in no 
ways violates the principle of sovereignty, since as with any form of international law par-
ties can make reservations to outcomes or decisions taken by a vote. In fact, a large num-
ber of international bodies use majority voting, including the EU, ILO, WTO, Montreal Pro-
tocol, GEF and the highest decision making body of the UN, the UN General Assembly. 
Financial Matters: Concerns over voting on financial issues appears to be a political block-
ade for both developing and developed parties. Many developed countries have a fear that 
“they could be overridden by the G-77 on budgetary and financial matters”16 in a situation 
of voting and accordingly “want to maintain their veto over financial matters”17. This issue 
                                            
 
14 Interaction with a Western European Delegate 03-12-12 
15 Interview with an Eastern European Delegate 12-06-13. Furthermore please refer to any of the recent Earth 
Negotiations Bulletins coverage of the recent ADP negotiations to see highlights of this central, yet repeti-
tive conflict. 
16 Interview with a high level secretariat member 12-06-13.	  
17 Interview with a senior UNFCCC secretariat advisor 12-06-13. 
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has a long history, with the US threatening to veto the original rules of procedure due to 
this concern.18 Clearly making voting on financial matters more nuanced than a simple ma-
jority where the G77 could band together and overpower donor countries is required in or-
der to make voting politically palatable for developed countries. However there is then the 
possibility that the G77 may dislike the idea of developed countries having a veto over fi-
nancial matters.19 Yet opposition to voting on this basis would seem somewhat nonsensical 
given that it would still be an improvement over the current predicament where every 
state grouping has a veto.  
Veto Attraction and Institutional Memory: Over time parties have grown to enjoy their ve-
to power and may forget the problems that consensus previously caused. As one interview-
ee bluntly stated “the parties now like what they have, they have a veto”20. A veto ensures 
that parties will be taken seriously, regardless of economic or geopolitical significance.21 It 
also guarantees that states have a greater degree of individual control over the outcome of 
negotiations. 
A related problem is that of the collective memory of the UNFCCC in relation to the history 
and success of consensus decision making. Some interviewees saw consensus decision mak-
ing as having been quite successful prior to recent setbacks, sentiments that were also ex-
pressed by Saudi Arabia and India during COP19. This overlooks the history of the Conven-
tion, including its inception. As one interviewee noted, the Convention itself was adopted 
over the protests of a number of countries who still had their plaques raised to speak22 and 
“it’s something we have conveniently forgotten”23. The UNFCCC was adopted without con-
sensus in 1992. Negotiations at COP6 at The Hague in 2000 collapsed due to an inability to 
reach consensus. The history of negotiations in relation to decision making is not an entire-
ly successful one, but there appears to be some failure in the institutional memory of the 
Convention.  
Consensus as a Process: Consensus as a process inherently favours the status quo and hand-
icaps attempts at transformation. The will of the many to change can be thwarted by one 
conservative voice. This can be seen in the section on legal implementation. If consensus 
had not been required to adopt the original rules of procedure then this current conun-
drum would not exist.  
                                            
 
18 Interview with a former high level secretariat member 14-05-13. 
19 Interview with a senior UNFCCC secretariat advisor 12-06-13. 
20 Interview with a senior UNFCCC secretariat advisor 12-06-13. 
21 Interview with a senior UNFCCC secretariat advisor 12-06-13. 
22 Interview with a former high level secretariat member who attended this session 14-05-13. 
23 Interview with a high level secretariat member 12-06-13. 
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Voting as a Double-Edged Sword: One legitimate appeal raised against voting was that con-
sensus and the use of a veto can also be used to block environmentally ineffective deci-
sions. Arguably the blocking of the adoption of the Copenhagen Accord at COP15 by Tuvalu 
and a number of ALBA and African countries constitutes at one incident when a veto was 
used to block an unambitious outcome. This is a fair criticism and a risk that must accom-
pany any resort to a voting system, although based on the history of negotiations it ap-
pears likely that in most cases the majority will be pushing for progressive rather than re-
gressive outcomes. Importantly, in such predicaments is it better to have no decision ra-
ther than a suboptimal one? 
Misconceptions on Voting: A recurrent idea amongst interviewees was that voting was a 
“divisive” process that could easily create wedges in an already overly politicised and an-
tagonistic arena. However, as previously noted this is rarely the case and voting tends to 
act as more of a consensus builder, although there are exceptions. One interviewee noted 
that the International Whaling Commission (IWC) tends to rely upon frequent voting rounds 
and has devolved into a continuous “numbers game”.24 While this is true, issues and eco-
nomics consequences are different between the UNFCCC and IWC. Moreover there is al-
ready a heavily ingrained practice of seeking consensus and valuing universalism within the 
Convention. It is not likely that parties would fall into a numbers game if voting was intro-
duced to the UNFCCC.  
Path Dependency: Path dependency is a meta-barrier that encompasses most of the other 
blockades to decision making change. The numerous barriers to change have developed in-
to a self-perpetuating culture and institutional practice. Parties have grown to appreciate 
their veto and have developed misconceptions on voting to further justify the status quo. 
All the barriers contribute to a form of path dependency that has locked in the current in-
stitutional state. Yet when the rules of procedure were first discussed in 1992, the vast 
majority of parties supported the notion of voting. It was only Saudi Arabia, and the US 
due to concerns over financial matters, who threatened to stop the adoption of voting ar-
rangements25; and eventually it was solely Saudi Arabia who eventually blocked their adop-
tion. Over time much of the Convention has established discourses and reasons to cement 
consensus into place; one respondent referenced this by claiming that “because of our 
practice we have now created an institutional law of consensus”.26 Path dependency can 
be broken as there are numerous precedents of international organisations evolving heir 
rules over time; for example The International Standards Organisation switched from con-
sensus to majority voting, as has the EU in a number of policy areas (Maggi and Morelli, 
                                            
 
24 Interview with a former secretariat member and academic 09-07-13. 
25 Interview with a former high level secretariat member who attended this session 14-05-13. 
26 Interview with a legal expert and civil society member 14-06-13. 
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2003, Pauwelyn, 2005). The question then becomes what can drive a change in decision 
making processes away from the current institutional trajectory. 
6.2 Drivers for Change 
Political Crises: The most important factor in breaking path dependency in the UNFCCC is 
crisis. Political failures have a catalysing effect upon the negotiations. The most recent 
example is Russia blocking the SBI. Not only did Russia put decision making reform back in-
to the international dialogue, but it also explicitly showcased the failures of the current 
system, in which countries could block the progress of an entire negotiating channel over 
the apparently trivial matter of an agenda item. Tuvalu highlighted the “supreme irony” of 
Russia’s actions by describing it as “crashing the car to prove the seatbelts don’t work”27. 
When veto rights are abused it undermines faith in consensus and creates an impetus to 
change. One interviewee stated “I would characterise what has just happened (the SBI 
blockage), despite being painful, as an opportunity”28. Crisis helps to deconstruct the sta-
tus quo and in doing so provides the space to develop new institutional structures. In the 
context of majority voting, political failure can delegitimise existing decision making prac-
tices and create political momentum for change.  
Attractiveness of Majority Voting: Majority voting, despite some reservations, was seen to 
be a more efficient and speedy decision making process in contrast to consensus by most 
interviewees. This positive perception could be further enhanced through the provision of 
further information. Highlighting successful previous applications of voting and delivering 
information on the implementation and consequences of voting could also help to make 
new arrangements more familiar, build trust and dispel misconceptions. This is important 
since, as one respondent put it, most would “rather stick with a known quantity than 
something completely different29.” Another way of making parties more at ease with vot-
ing would be to highlight voting procedures used within related bodies and implement it 
into new ones. One respondent noted that this more ‘bottom-up approach’ could be ex-
tremely useful since it largely avoids the more difficult conversation on rules of procedure 
while aiding the work of other bodies under the Convention30. The Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF) already makes use of double qualified majority voting and the Green Climate 
Fund is currently debating the use of voting measures within the Board.  
 
 
                                            
 
27 Personal observation at the final SBI plenary 14-06-13.	  
28 Interview with a senior UNFCCC secretariat member 12-06-13. 
29 Interview with a US academic 05-12-12. 
30 Interaction with a developing country respondent 05-12-12. 


































































Figure 1: Institutional Dimensions of Decision Making Change in the UNFCCC31 
 
From the interaction of the institutional aspects of decision making change in the UNFCCC 
(Figure 1), a number of leverage points in driving change can be identified. Firstly, path 
dependency is the central impediment to decision making change with political crisis as 
the only driver with equivalent power. Importantly there is a positive feedback loop pres-
ently working to heighten the probability of political failure. As the 2015 deadline ap-
proaches there is an increasing level of political tension and many controversial issues that 
have previously been avoided, such as loss and damages or response measures, are coming 
to the fore. While consensus was most recently reached on these issues at COP19, the out-
comes are tenuous and focus mainly on developing processes and frameworks, while loss 
and damages has a revision at COP22 enshrined as part of the compromise agreement. 
These issues are not entirely resolved. Buchanan (Buchanan, 2001) refers to the ‘critical 
state’, a state in non-equilibrium dynamic systems in which increasing interconnectedness 
leads to a tendency for sudden and tumultuous changes. The critical state has been re-
peatedly proved to reoccur in physical systems, but Buchanan goes one step further and 
propose that this state is ubiquitous in complex systems. I would suggest that consensus 
within the UNFCCC could be encouraging the Convention to be self-organise into a critical 
state. The re-emergence of unresolved issues has led to an increasing reliance upon veto 
rights and a responsive suppression of dissent, as occurred at COP16 and COP18. This 
strains relations between parties while the fundamental negotiating issues often remain 
unresolved. Unfortunately the 2015 agreement includes almost all of the significant issues 
                                            
 
31 Polarities display how one variable affects the rate of change in another variable. Accordingly a ‘+’ indi-
cates an increase in the rate of change in the next variable. 


















































of the negotiations and there is a practice of not agreeing to anything until everything is 
agreed. This interconnectedness makes the use of a veto more likely and the consequences 
of that use more severe. History has embedded path dependency, but new and future dy-
namics are degrading it by increasing possibility of a political crisis. The provision of in-
formation on decision making can challenge existing institutional norms and legitimise new 
processes, yet this is a necessary but not sufficient condition to induce change and politi-
cal crisis is ultimately needed. 
 
7 Scenarios 
Based upon the preceding analysis of the legal, political and institutional dynamics within 
the UNFCCC there are six main scenarios for decision making change in the Convention. 
These scenarios, together with the legal pathways towards them, are depicted in Figure 2. 
One of these scenarios (Dual Institutions) follows from implementation via amendments to 











Figure 2: Scenarios for the Implementation of Voting Systems into the UNFCCC 
 
Dual Institutions: The least likely and perhaps least productive outcome of introducing ma-
jority voting would be amendments to the Convention without universal ratification. As 
noted previously this would lead to a split regime, in which dual institutions with different 
rules would require different COP decisions. Due to worries over this possibility, along with 
the “Pandora’s box” fear, this scenario is the least likely to occur.  
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Alternative A: This scenario would see the adoption of rules of procedure according to Al-
ternative A of Draft Rule 42.1 (see Appendix I). The adoption of the original Alternative A, 
is posited as a scenario since adopting the original Alternative A language is likely to be the 
quickest, and perhaps least controversial method, for any chair to adopt a rules of proce-
dure which specifies majority voting. Since this scenario does not specify a larger majority 
for financial matters it is unlikely to occur.  
Alternative B: This scenario would see the adoption of rules of procedure according to the 
current Alternative B of Draft Rule 42.1. This would simply be the official adoption and en-
dorsement of consensus within the UNFCCC. This is improbable since parties are unlikely to 
invest the necessary political will of adopting rules of procedure in order to maintain the 
status quo; and the current wording actually has a lower (two-thirds) qualification for fi-
nancial matters.  
Double qualified Majority Voting: This scenario would involve the adoption of an amended 
Draft Rule 42 with a double qualification upon financial, or substantial matters, or both. 
The Montreal Protocol uses an innovative voting system whereby two qualifications need to 
be met for an affirmative vote: a simple majority of both developing and developed mem-
ber parties (UNEP, 2007). This system allayed the fears of developed countries that the G-
77 would unify and utilise its superior numbers to control outcomes. A double qualified 
majority voting system could be effective in persuading developed countries who have 
voiced this fear. However, as one interviewee noted, such a system would have to work in 
the context of the current annexes within the UNFCCC, which are contested and may make 
the idea politically unpalatable32.  
Layered Voting: This scenario involves adopting an amended version of Draft Rule 42 which 
stipulates a higher majority for matters of finance and the adoption of protocols. Layered 
Voting is the assignment of varying qualifications to different voting matters based on po-
litical concerns. The benefit is that it allows for more controversial or important matters 
to have more stringent voting qualifications placed upon them. Countries will not walk 
away from the Convention due to a dispute over a procedural matter such as the election 
of a chair, while more sensitive matters, such as financing measures, could be given a 
higher voting threshold. Voting issues can be separated along four main lines: procedural, 
substantial and financial matters, and the adoption of legal instruments. I suggest changes 
to Draft Rule 42 that would lead to the following system of Layered Voting: 
• Procedural issues shall require a simple majority vote33. 
                                            
 
32 Interview with an academic and former UNFCCC secretariat member 21-04-13.	  
33 While some procedural matters are defined in the draft rules of procedure, there are numerous ambigui-
ties. Where ambiguity exists the distinction between procedural and substantial and left to the discretion of 
the chair as per rule 42.3 of the draft rules of procedure. This in itself is an often arbitrary and questiona-
ble practice that could use revision; however it lies beyond the scope of this paper.  
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• Matters of substance shall require a three-quarters majority vote. 
• The adoption of protocols or legal instruments shall require a three quarters major-
ity vote covering over 50% of current emissions regulated under the UNFCCC. It 
should be noted that the conditions for entry into force for any protocol would still 
need to be specified under that particular instrument as per Article 17(3) of the 
Convention. 
• Financial matters shall operate by a double qualified majority vote requiring a sim-
ple majority of all parties present and voting, and a simple majority of all financial 
contributions (this could avoid the issue of using the politically poisonous annex sys-
tem while preventing the G77 from having a decisive voting quota). Alternatively 
financial matters could be decided through a 90% super-majority for greater sim-
plicity.  
Layered Voting is an ideal approach and provides for unique voting arrangements. It pro-
vides a pragmatic and effective way of introducing majority voting into the UNFCCC 
through a flexible design that can be suited to the political context to address specific 
concerns and maximise political feasibility. Other MEAs which work on consensus (CBD, 
Stockholm Convention etc.) by default could adopt a Layered Voting model since the dis-
tinction between voting issues holds true across all MEAs. 
Layered Voting is a flexible option and could be modified to suit less ambitious conditions. 
Some interviewees claimed that the greatest potential for voting is just for unblocking 
procedural matters. This would be a significant step forward as it would help to avoid pre-
dicaments such as the recent Russian blockage of the SBI. In a situation of low political ap-
petite for change then an alternative version of Layered Voting could be a two thirds ma-
jority vote for procedural matters, 90% threshold for substantial matters, and consensus 
(or consensus minus one or two) for the adoption of legal instruments and decisions related 
to finance.  
Layered Voting provides a pragmatic and effective way of introducing majority voting into 
the UNFCCC through a flexible design that can be suited to the political context to address 
specific concerns and maximise political feasibility. Other MEAs which work on consensus 
(CBD, Stockholm Convention etc.) by default could adopt a Layered Voting model since 
these MEAs have the same distinction between voting issues. 
Common but Differentiated Voting (CBDV): CBDV is proposed as an ideal, but not feasible 
voting system, and as such has less connection with the examined barriers and opportuni-
ties. It is presented as a scenario here to provide an informative example of how voting 
could be structured in conditions free of strong political constraints and what the resulting 
distribution of voting power could look like. It could provide lessons or a possible model for 
the decision making of future environmental agreements and bodies. This voting system 
would operate in line with the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ 
under Article 3.1 of the Convention. Drawing upon this principle I have developed a system 
of voting which gives every country a right to vote, but differentiates their voting power 
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on the basis of the three criteria of population, mitigation and vulnerability. The weighting 
on vulnerability provides input legitimacy to the system by giving voice and power to those 
who are most impacted by climate change and accordingly the decisions of the COP. The 
issue of procedural legitimacy by including most vulnerable must be addressed as it has 
been a reoccurring objection to other alternative proposed forms of decision making, such 
as minilateralism (Eckersley, 2012). This form of weighting would also be in accordance 
with Article 3.2 of the convention which states the need to fully consider the “special cir-
cumstances of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable 
to the adverse effects of climate change”. One clear problem with this criterion is that 
there are still methodological disputes on how technically measure vulnerability. An exam-
ple of this could include whether to measure vulnerability simply by projected impacts at-
tributable to climate change, or additionally by including the capacity of the state to 
adapt to the impacts. In my presented example (Table 2) data for vulnerability is based 
upon the 2010 dataset for the Global Vulnerability Index created by David Wheeler of the 
Centre for Global Development (Wheeler, 2011). It draws upon climate vulnerability data 
that has been adjusted to account for income and regulation (indicators of adaptive capac-
ity).  
The second criteria of population would more fully embody the principle of democracy 
than the current one-country one-vote system, which is more representative of the legal 
norm of sovereignty (Schwartzberg, 2003). Moreover, it better reflects geopolitical reali-
ties by giving greater weighting, and appealing to, the rising economic powerhouses of the 
BASIC group. Population would have to be tied to a common baseline in order to avoid a 
perverse incentive for increasing population in order to expand voting power. Population 
figures were taken from the World Bank 2012 data set (WB, 2013). 
The third criteria of weighting on the basis of mitigation targets provides an incentive for 
developed countries to increase their mitigation commitments and for developing coun-
tries to take on their own, thus helping create the conditions for a ‘race to the top’. This 
is similar to the logic of weighting votes based on financial contributions in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Weighting mitigation efforts both encourages 
and rewards leadership. Since most countries have not put forward clear mitigation targets 
for the 2015 climate agreement, the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI), created by 
German Watch, has been used to measure the mitigation performance. The CCPI measures 
the mitigation efforts of 58 individual countries who account for over 90% of global emis-
sions (Germanwatch, 2014). The CCPI ranks countries by an index of which 80% is assessed 
by objective measurements of emissions trends and levels, and 20% by policy assessment 
from international experts. The remaining countries that are not covered by the CCPI ac-
count for an insignificant amount of emissions individually and therefore their scores have 
been moderated to a common low score (0.01 by the CCPI scoring system).  
Table 2 provides an example of how the distribution of votes under a CBDV system would 
look. As noted previously, there are clear constraints and problems in measuring and quan-
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tifying both mitigation performance and vulnerability, and accordingly this example is an 
imperfect attempt using the best current available data and measurements. If any such 
system were to truly be implemented within the convention, it would likely require the 
secretariat to undertake specific measurements of both vulnerability and mitigation agreed 
to by the parties.  
The example below has modified the weighting of votes so that while population and miti-
gation are of equal weighting, vulnerability counts for less towards a country’s overall vot-
ing power. As shown in Table 3 the votes are weighted so that the end voting score is com-
prised by 43.3% for mitigation, 43.3% for population and 13.3% for vulnerability. The ra-
tionale for this is both logical and geopolitical. Firstly, in a five or six degree world the im-
pacts of climate change are severe enough to constitute a global systemic threat, and thus 
state-based evaluations are less relevant in the long-term. Secondly, the most vulnerable 
countries are also generally those who are least significant in terms of emissions, and thus 
their buy-in for political agreements is somewhat less important. These weighting modifi-
ers balance legitimacy against ensuring that power still largely rests with those who are 
most needed to ensure effective global mitigation. 
Table 2: CBDV Bloc Voting Entitlements 
Blocs Weighted Vote 
EU 25.298% 
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OVP= Overall Voting Power 
Individual member party scores are depicted as a % of the overall total. The table is ranked from 
largest to smallest in terms of the end voting score.  
 
Member	  Party	   P	   V	   M	   OVP	  (%)	  
China	   19.31%	   0.69%	   1.58%	   9.14%	  
India	   17.68%	   1.05%	   1.72%	   8.55%	  
United	  States	  of	  America	   4.49%	   0.00%	   1.59%	   2.63%	  
Indonesia	   3.53%	   0.16%	   1.69%	   2.28%	  
Brazil	   2.84%	   0.02%	   1.67%	   1.96%	  
Mexico	   1.73%	   0.04%	   1.85%	   1.55%	  
Russian	  Federation	   2.05%	   0.01%	   1.31%	   1.46%	  
Japan	   1.82%	   0.01%	   1.42%	   1.41%	  
Germany	   1.17%	   0.00%	   1.86%	   1.31%	  
United	  Kingdom	  of	  Great	  Britain	  	  
and	  Northern	  Ireland	   0.90%	   0.00%	   2.09%	   1.30%	  
France	   0.94%	   0.00%	   1.98%	   1.27%	  
Egypt	   1.15%	   -­‐0.06%	   1.77%	   1.26%	  
Italy	   0.87%	   0.00%	   1.89%	   1.20%	  
Pakistan	   2.56%	   0.45%	   0.03%	   1.18%	  
Thailand	   0.95%	   0.12%	   1.64%	   1.14%	  
Nigeria	   2.41%	   0.31%	   0.03%	   1.10%	  
Spain	   0.66%	   0.00%	   1.81%	   1.07%	  
Bangladesh	   2.21%	   1.55%	   0.03%	   1.18%	  
Turkey	   1.06%	   0.03%	   1.40%	   1.07%	  
Morocco	   0.47%	   0.21%	   1.92%	   1.06%	  
South	  Africa	   0.73%	   0.06%	   1.62%	   1.03%	  
Denmark	   0.08%	   0.00%	   2.26%	   1.01%	  
Ukraine	   0.65%	   0.02%	   1.68%	   1.01%	  
Iran	  (Islamic	  Republic	  of)	   1.09%	   0.15%	   1.14%	   0.99%	  
Romania	   0.30%	   0.01%	   1.92%	   0.96%	  
Portugal	   0.15%	   0.01%	   2.06%	   0.96%	  
Argentina	   0.59%	   0.01%	   1.61%	   0.95%	  
Somalia	   0.15%	   14.14%	   0.03%	   1.96%	  
Sweden	   0.14%	   0.00%	   2.05%	   0.95%	  
Poland	   0.55%	   0.01%	   1.58%	   0.93%	  
Switzerland	   0.11%	   0.00%	   1.99%	   0.91%	  
Belgium	   0.16%	   0.00%	   1.94%	   0.91%	  
Hungary	   0.14%	   0.00%	   1.96%	   0.91%	  
Algeria	   0.55%	   0.15%	   1.50%	   0.91%	  
Ireland	   0.07%	   0.00%	   1.95%	   0.88%	  
Malta	   0.01%	   0.00%	   1.99%	   0.86%	  
Slovakia	   0.08%	   0.01%	   1.90%	   0.86%	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Iceland	   0.00%	   0.00%	   1.95%	   0.85%	  
Netherlands	   0.24%	   0.00%	   1.71%	   0.85%	  
Lithuania	   0.04%	   0.01%	   1.83%	   0.81%	  
Norway	   0.07%	   0.00%	   1.78%	   0.80%	  
Austria	   0.12%	   0.00%	   1.72%	   0.80%	  
Malaysia	   0.42%	   0.03%	   1.41%	   0.80%	  
Belarus	   0.14%	   0.03%	   1.70%	   0.80%	  
Luxembourg	   0.01%	   0.00%	   1.81%	   0.79%	  
Slovenia	   0.03%	   0.01%	   1.78%	   0.78%	  
Democratic	  People's	  Republic	  of	  Korea	   0.35%	   0.33%	   1.40%	   0.80%	  
Latvia	   0.03%	   0.01%	   1.77%	   0.78%	  
Finland	   0.08%	   0.00%	   1.70%	   0.77%	  
Czech	  Republic	   0.15%	   0.00%	   1.62%	   0.77%	  
Bulgaria	   0.10%	   0.01%	   1.65%	   0.76%	  
Cyprus	   0.02%	   0.00%	   1.73%	   0.76%	  
Canada	   0.50%	   0.00%	   1.21%	   0.74%	  
Greece	   0.16%	   0.01%	   1.55%	   0.74%	  
Ethiopia	   1.31%	   2.40%	   0.03%	   0.90%	  
New	  Zealand	   0.06%	   0.00%	   1.61%	   0.72%	  
Croatia	   0.06%	   0.01%	   1.59%	   0.72%	  
Myanmar	   0.75%	   5.64%	   0.03%	   1.09%	  
Singapore	   0.08%	   0.00%	   1.51%	   0.69%	  
Australia	   0.32%	   0.00%	   1.25%	   0.68%	  
Philippines	   1.38%	   0.27%	   0.03%	   0.65%	  
Estonia	   0.02%	   0.01%	   1.37%	   0.60%	  
Vietnam	   1.27%	   0.52%	   0.03%	   0.63%	  
Kazakhstan	   0.24%	   -­‐0.03%	   1.13%	   0.59%	  
Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo	   0.94%	   2.14%	   0.03%	   0.71%	  
Saudi	  Arabia	   0.40%	   0.01%	   0.76%	   0.50%	  
Burundi	   0.14%	   5.83%	   0.03%	   0.85%	  
United	  Republic	  of	  Tanzania	   0.68%	   0.80%	   0.03%	   0.42%	  
Sudan	   0.53%	   1.71%	   0.03%	   0.47%	  
Afghanistan	   0.43%	   2.10%	   0.03%	   0.48%	  
Republic	  of	  Korea	   0.72%	   0.00%	   0.03%	   0.32%	  
Colombia	   0.68%	   0.06%	   0.03%	   0.32%	  
Kenya	   0.62%	   0.19%	   0.03%	   0.31%	  
Uganda	   0.52%	   0.67%	   0.03%	   0.33%	  
Zimbabwe	   0.20%	   2.88%	   0.03%	   0.48%	  
Eritrea	   0.09%	   3.38%	   0.03%	   0.50%	  
Central	  African	  Republic	   0.06%	   3.51%	   0.03%	   0.51%	  
Iraq	   0.47%	   0.38%	   0.03%	   0.27%	  
Niger	   0.25%	   1.86%	   0.03%	   0.37%	  
Nepal	   0.39%	   0.71%	   0.03%	   0.28%	  
Mozambique	   0.36%	   0.88%	   0.03%	   0.29%	  
Uzbekistan	   0.43%	   0.33%	   0.03%	   0.24%	  
Malawi	   0.23%	   1.62%	   0.03%	   0.33%	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Madagascar	   0.32%	   0.96%	   0.03%	   0.28%	  
Guinea-­‐Bissau	   0.02%	   2.98%	   0.03%	   0.42%	  
Liberia	   0.06%	   2.73%	   0.03%	   0.40%	  
Peru	   0.43%	   0.06%	   0.03%	   0.21%	  
Venezuela	  (Bolivarian	  Republic	  of)	   0.43%	   0.03%	   0.03%	   0.20%	  
Rwanda	   0.16%	   1.81%	   0.03%	   0.33%	  
Yemen	   0.34%	   0.51%	   0.03%	   0.23%	  
Ghana	   0.36%	   0.20%	   0.03%	   0.20%	  
Chad	   0.18%	   1.27%	   0.03%	   0.26%	  
Syrian	  Arab	  Republic	   0.32%	   0.27%	   0.03%	   0.19%	  
Mali	   0.21%	   0.94%	   0.03%	   0.23%	  
Cameroon	   0.31%	   0.23%	   0.03%	   0.18%	  
Guinea	   0.16%	   1.24%	   0.03%	   0.25%	  
Burkina	  Faso	   0.24%	   0.72%	   0.03%	   0.21%	  
Angola	   0.30%	   0.22%	   0.03%	   0.17%	  
Sri	  Lanka	   0.29%	   0.27%	   0.03%	   0.18%	  
Zambia	   0.20%	   0.88%	   0.03%	   0.22%	  
Côte	  d'Ivoire	   0.28%	   0.29%	   0.03%	   0.17%	  
Sierra	  Leone	   0.09%	   1.60%	   0.03%	   0.26%	  
Senegal	   0.20%	   0.81%	   0.03%	   0.21%	  
Cambodia	   0.21%	   0.67%	   0.03%	   0.19%	  
Togo	   0.09%	   1.44%	   0.03%	   0.25%	  
Haiti	   0.15%	   0.99%	   0.03%	   0.21%	  
Chile	   0.25%	   0.01%	   0.03%	   0.12%	  
Cuba	   0.16%	   0.59%	   0.03%	   0.16%	  
Benin	   0.14%	   0.71%	   0.03%	   0.17%	  
Ecuador	   0.22%	   0.14%	   0.03%	   0.13%	  
Guatemala	   0.22%	   0.13%	   0.03%	   0.12%	  
Kiribati	   0.00%	   1.42%	   0.03%	   0.20%	  
Bolivia	   0.15%	   0.36%	   0.03%	   0.13%	  
Lao	  People's	  Democratic	  Republic	   0.10%	   0.67%	   0.03%	   0.14%	  
Comoros	   0.01%	   1.26%	   0.03%	   0.19%	  
Papua	  New	  Guinea	   0.10%	   0.58%	   0.03%	   0.14%	  
Lesotho	   0.03%	   0.99%	   0.03%	   0.16%	  
Tunisia	   0.15%	   0.09%	   0.03%	   0.09%	  
Dominican	  Republic	   0.15%	   0.12%	   0.03%	   0.09%	  
Congo	   0.06%	   0.60%	   0.03%	   0.12%	  
Honduras	   0.11%	   0.23%	   0.03%	   0.09%	  
Mauritania	   0.05%	   0.62%	   0.03%	   0.12%	  
Tajikistan	   0.11%	   0.19%	   0.03%	   0.09%	  
Azerbaijan	   0.13%	   0.05%	   0.03%	   0.08%	  
United	  Arab	  Emirates	   0.13%	   0.01%	   0.03%	   0.07%	  
Paraguay	   0.10%	   0.25%	   0.03%	   0.09%	  
Solomon	  Islands	   0.01%	   0.78%	   0.03%	   0.12%	  
Nicaragua	   0.09%	   0.22%	   0.03%	   0.08%	  
Israel	   0.11%	   0.00%	   0.03%	   0.06%	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Serbia	   0.10%	   0.03%	   0.03%	   0.06%	  
Timor-­‐Leste	   0.02%	   0.63%	   0.03%	   0.10%	  
Turkmenistan	   0.07%	   0.23%	   0.03%	   0.08%	  
Gambia	   0.03%	   0.55%	   0.03%	   0.10%	  
El	  Salvador	   0.09%	   0.07%	   0.03%	   0.06%	  
Jordan	   0.09%	   0.05%	   0.03%	   0.06%	  
Libya	   0.09%	   0.07%	   0.03%	   0.06%	  
Tuvalu	   0.00%	   0.67%	   0.03%	   0.10%	  
Kyrgyzstan	   0.08%	   0.09%	   0.03%	   0.06%	  
Djibouti	   0.01%	   0.46%	   0.03%	   0.08%	  
Micronesia	  (Federated	  States	  of)	   0.00%	   0.53%	   0.03%	   0.08%	  
Vanuatu	   0.00%	   0.51%	   0.03%	   0.08%	  
Costa	  Rica	   0.07%	   0.05%	   0.03%	   0.05%	  
Namibia	   0.03%	   0.27%	   0.03%	   0.06%	  
Swaziland	   0.02%	   0.37%	   0.03%	   0.07%	  
Tonga	   0.00%	   0.48%	   0.03%	   0.08%	  
Georgia	   0.06%	   0.03%	   0.03%	   0.05%	  
Lebanon	   0.06%	   0.03%	   0.03%	   0.04%	  
Republic	  of	  Moldova	   0.05%	   0.09%	   0.03%	   0.05%	  
Nauru	   0.00%	   0.43%	   0.03%	   0.07%	  
Guyana	   0.01%	   0.35%	   0.03%	   0.06%	  
Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	   0.05%	   0.04%	   0.03%	   0.04%	  
Sao	  Tome	  and	  Principe	   0.00%	   0.40%	   0.03%	   0.07%	  
Saint	  Lucia	   0.00%	   0.40%	   0.03%	   0.07%	  
Panama	   0.05%	   0.03%	   0.03%	   0.04%	  
Samoa	   0.00%	   0.38%	   0.03%	   0.07%	  
Grenada	   0.00%	   0.39%	   0.03%	   0.07%	  
Jamaica	   0.04%	   0.11%	   0.03%	   0.04%	  
Albania	   0.05%	   0.04%	   0.03%	   0.04%	  
Oman	   0.05%	   0.02%	   0.03%	   0.04%	  
Uruguay	   0.05%	   0.01%	   0.03%	   0.04%	  
Mongolia	   0.04%	   0.06%	   0.03%	   0.04%	  
Saint	  Vincent	  and	  the	  Grenadines	   0.00%	   0.32%	   0.03%	   0.06%	  
Kuwait	   0.05%	   0.00%	   0.03%	   0.03%	  
Bhutan	   0.01%	   0.25%	   0.03%	   0.05%	  
Armenia	   0.04%	   0.03%	   0.03%	   0.03%	  
Marshall	  Islands	   0.00%	   0.30%	   0.03%	   0.05%	  
Maldives	   0.00%	   0.26%	   0.03%	   0.05%	  
Equatorial	  Guinea	   0.01%	   0.20%	   0.03%	   0.04%	  
Botswana	   0.03%	   0.07%	   0.03%	   0.03%	  
Cape	  Verde	   0.01%	   0.22%	   0.03%	   0.04%	  
Fiji	   0.01%	   0.15%	   0.03%	   0.04%	  
Saint	  Kitts	  and	  Nevis	   0.00%	   0.23%	   0.03%	   0.04%	  
Trinidad	  and	  Tobago	   0.02%	   0.10%	   0.03%	   0.03%	  
Gabon	   0.02%	   0.07%	   0.03%	   0.03%	  
The	  former	  Yugoslav	  Republic	  of	  Macedonia	   0.03%	   0.02%	   0.03%	   0.03%	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Qatar	   0.03%	   0.00%	   0.03%	   0.03%	  
Antigua	  and	  Barbuda	   0.00%	   0.19%	   0.03%	   0.04%	  
Dominica	   0.00%	   0.18%	   0.03%	   0.04%	  
Barbados	   0.00%	   0.14%	   0.03%	   0.03%	  
Mauritius	   0.02%	   0.04%	   0.03%	   0.03%	  
Belize	   0.00%	   0.13%	   0.03%	   0.03%	  
Bahrain	   0.02%	   0.03%	   0.03%	   0.03%	  
Suriname	   0.01%	   0.10%	   0.03%	   0.03%	  
Bahamas	   0.01%	   0.09%	   0.03%	   0.03%	  
Cook	  Islands	   0.00%	   0.10%	   0.03%	   0.03%	  
Niue	   0.0%	   0.10%	   0.03%	   0.03%	  
Montenegro	   0.01%	   0.03%	   0.03%	   0.02%	  
Seychelles	   0.00%	   0.08%	   0.03%	   0.02%	  
Brunei	  Darussalam	   0.01%	   0.01%	   0.03%	   0.02%	  
Palau	   0.00%	   0.04%	   0.03%	   0.02%	  
Andorra	   0.00%	   0.00%	   0.03%	   0.01%	  
Monaco	   0.00%	   0.00%	   0.03%	   0.01%	  
Liechtenstein	   0.00%	   0.00%	   0.03%	   0.01%	  
San	  Marino	   0.00%	   0.00%	   0.03%	   0.01%	  
 
The EU stands to benefit most from the CBDV arrangements (due to their mitigation ef-
forts) followed by the BASIC bloc, the LDCS and then the Umbrella Group. This allocation 
fits the previously mentioned second of CMG governance by redistributing power away 
from the Umbrella Group, and hence the US, and places an emphasis towards the more 
progressive parties (the EU), most vulnerable states (the LDCs) and most important coun-
tries in terms of future emissions (the BASIC bloc). This distribution could even provide a 
pathway towards a semi-global critical mass agreement built around the EU and BASIC 
states. Importantly, the Umbrella Group is not permanently marginalised and could easily 
become a larger voting force if their individual members improve their domestic mitigation 
efforts. 
CBDV is an idealistic model; despite its advantages it is never likely to come into exist-
ence. There are two main factors which limit its political feasibility. Firstly, it violates Ar-
ticle 18 of the convention which stipulates that “Each party to the convention shall have 
one vote”. Therefore weighted voting would require an amendment to Article 18 before its 
adoption, and it would prove to be almost impossible to have parties universally ratify such 
a radical change. Secondly, it is even less probable that member parties could come to an 
amicable agreement on voting criteria. Considering that parties to the UNFCCC have had 
struggles with developing picking facilitators, assigning voting quotas would prove near im-
possible. This is particularly true when political hand-grenades like historical responsibility 
could easily be put forward as possible criteria. 
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8 Conclusion: Risk and Opportunity 
The inconvenient truth is that use of consensus within the UNFCCC is unlikely to lead to 
the fulfilment of the ultimate objective of avoiding dangerous anthropogenic climate 
change. Voting, in the context of the Convention, is a more efficient and potentially effec-
tive alternative. Path dependency is a substantial barrier to changing from consensus, but 
the potential of adopting rules of procedure and catalysing effect of political crisis make 
the implementation of voting both legally and politically possible. I propose that Layered 
Voting is the best way forward in terms of a politically feasible voting system and that the 
model of CBDV provides an idealistic, but currently unrealistic, decision making system. 
There are a number of interesting avenues for further exploration of UNFCCC decision 
making. Firstly, can the UNFCCC act as a catalyst amongst other MEAs and spread majority 
voting as a new norm for international environmental governance? It is generally assumed 
that MEAs learn from each other, but there is little empirical evidence that this is true. 
Research on the diffusion of rules and procedures between MEAs is therefore an important 
future area of study. Secondly, if voting was to be adopted, what would a global climate 
agreement without the US look like? Would it be similar to the third form of CMG where 
the US could pick and choose which issue-specific protocols it could ratify? Would it be 
more of a hybrid agreement that combines and connects the bottom-up forces and sub-
national actors in the US with the benefits of a top-down international approach? How this 
form of multi-level, critical mass governance requires further investigation.  
The main driver for change within the UNFCCC, and perhaps the wider field of environ-
mental governance, is likely to be crisis. Ironically, the long term success of the UNFCCC 
may be dependent upon its short term failure. In this respect the 2015 agreement and 
lead-up negotiations provide the best opportunity for a political crisis and decision making 
change. The fortunes of the next climate agreement and the rules of procedure are intri-
cately interwoven. Naturally there are inherent risks in having the process of consensus 
collapse within the UNFCCC. It must be questioned whether the potential benefits of in-
troducing majority voting outweigh the risks attendant upon both a short-term crisis and 
continuing with a decision making process that appears to be fatally flawed. The Hitchhik-
ers Guide to the Galaxy by Douglas Adams once made the famous quip that “the answer to 
the ultimate question of life, the universe and everything” was the number 42 (1979: 99). 
While it may not be that cosmic, the number still carries some significance. The future of 
the UNFCCC, and perhaps of many of the other MEAs, may lie within Draft Rule 42 and the 
possibility of majority voting. 
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Appendix I: Draft Rule 42 
 
Rule 42 
[1. Alternative A 
The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on all matters of substance by 
consensus. If all efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted and no agreement has 
been reached, the decision shall, as a last resort, be taken by a two-thirds majority 
vote of the Parties present and voting, except: 
(a) as otherwise provided by the Convention, the financial rules referred to in Article 
7, paragraph 2 (k) of the Convention or the present rules of procedure[.] [;] 
[(b) for a decision to adopt a proposed protocol, which shall be taken by [consensus] [a 
three-fourths majority of the Parties present and voting][.] [;] 
[(c) for decisions under paragraph 3 of Article 4 and paragraphs 1, 3 or4 of Article 11 
of the Convention, which shall be taken by consensus.] 
1. Alternative B 
Decisions on matters of substance shall be taken by consensus, except that decisions 
on financial matters shall be taken by a two-thirds majority vote. 
2. Decisions of the Conference of the Parties on matters of procedure shall be taken by a 
majority vote of the Parties present and voting [, except that adoption of a motion or 
proposal to close or limit debate or the list of speakers shall require a two-thirds ma-
jority vote of the Parties present and voting]. 
3. If the question arises as to whether a matter is one of a procedural or substantive na-
ture, the President shall rule on the question. An appeal against this ruling shall be put to 
the vote immediately and the President’s ruling shall stand unless overruled by a majority 
of the Parties present and voting. 
4. If, on matters other than elections, a vote is equally divided, a second vote shall be 
taken. If this vote is also equally divided, the proposal shall be regarded as rejected. 
5. For the purposes of this rule, the phrase "Parties present and voting" means Parties pre-
sent at the meeting at which voting takes place and casting an affirmative or negative 
vote. Parties abstaining from voting shall be considered as not voting. 
 
